Suchergebnisse

Legal culture v. legal tradition /Alan Watson --Legal cultures and legal traditions /H. Patrick Glenn --Legal epistemology and transformation of legal cultures /Marek Zirk-Sadowski --Epistemology and comparative law : contributions from the sciences and social sciences /Geoffrey Samuel --How to make comparable things : legal engineering at the service of comparative law /Juha Karhu (previously Juha Pöyhönen) --Methodology and European law - can methodology change so as to cope with the multiplicity of the law? /Karl-Heinz Ladeur --Comparative law of obligations : methodology and epistemology /Christian von Bar --Codifying European private law /Walter van Gerven --Deep level comparative law /Mark van Hoecke --NICE dreams and realities of European private law /Nikolas Roos --Europeanisation of national legal systems : some consequences for legal thinking in civil law countries /Jan M. Smits --Comparative law and the internationalisation of law in Europe /Mireille Delmas-Marty --Public law in Europe : caught between the national and sub-national and the European? /John Bell --New challenges in public and private international legal theory : can comparative scholarship help? /Horatia Muir Watt --Abridged or forbidden speech : how can speech be regulated through speech? /François Rigaux --Legisprudence of comparative law /Luc J. Wintgens --Rawls' political conception of rights and liberties : an illiberal but pragmatic approach to the problems of harmonisation and globalisation /Paul de Hert and Serge Gutwirth --Family trees for legal systems : towards a contemporary approach /Esin Örücü --Acommon legal language in Europe? /Anne Lise Kjær.

Abstract
While there is a growing jurisprudence in the field of art (aesthetics) and international law, there is still space to theorise about the philosophical approach that we choose when we decide to engage the discipline as an artistic endeavour. In this article I argue that an aesthetic conception of international law can help go past the limitations imposed by rationalist accounts of legal order by thinking of it as an experience rather than a social science. This subjective shift in emphasis does not have to commit to a preordained theory of how international law is meant to look like, but rather focuses on the manner in which international lawyers engage with their discipline. I conclude by arguing that international law is not a naturally occurring phenomenon which exists in the empirical world and which we pick out by our senses – it is a human artefact constructed through our involvement with reality. This allows for many argumentative possibilities, and it is by the action of choosing these possibilities that we define the boundaries of what international law is.